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ABSTRACT
Triggerstrategists may be defined as actors i r asset markets
who buy or sell when the price reaches a pr edeter ml ned level; they
include participants in portfolio insurance schemes in equity
markets and central banks who i nterverie to defend an exchange rate
target zone. This paper presents an approach to rnodel.l ing the
effectsof trigger strategists, with emphasis on how target zones
affectmarketexpectations. It is shownthat.commitment to defend
a target zone will generate stabilizing expectations within the
band,which maygenerate a "target zone honeymoon". an extended
period in which the announcement of a target zone stabilizes
exchange rates without any riced for action on thepartof
authorities. However, an imperfectly credible target zone is





Cambridge, MA 02138A striking feature of financial markets in the lQBOsis the
presenceof important participants who follow what we can call
gerstrategies --thatis, whocommitthemselves to buy or
sell when the pricereaches some pr c—determl ned 1 evol. I ri equity
marketsthe trigger strategy is followed by private investors
participating in portfolio insurance schemes,whoorder their
computers to sell stock when the price drops below a specified
level. In foreign exchange markets the trigger strategy is
followed by central banks, who intervene when the exchange rate
reaches the limit of a target zone.
Thereare many questi ens that. ricedtobe answered regar ding
triggerstrategies.When followed by private agents, are such
strategies rati orial?When followed by central banks, are they
welfare—improving? However, the first question we need to ask is a
descriptiveone: how does the presence of trigger strategists
affect the dynamics of market behavior? Ever this is a highly
disputed question i ri practice. Manyobserversblameport fall C)
insuranceschemes for the rnassi ye collapse of world equity prices
inOctober 187 others dismiss the idea. Defenders of' the
EuropeanMonetary System claim thatthe presence of intervention
limits gives rise t.o stabilizing expectations critics believe
thatthe limits create targets for speculative attacks arid are
ultimately destabilizing.
This paper presents an approach to modelling the effects of
triggerstrategies on price dynamics. The underlying method is to
determine an equilibrium relationship between the "fundamentals"
thatdrive an asset market and asset prices. The presence of a
large group of triggerstrategists alters this equilibrium in
1certain characteristic ways, which turn out to have a surprisingly
simple geometrical interpretation in terms of the concavity or
convexity of the relationship between fundamentals and prices.
Similar issues have been discussed in earlier work on price
dynamics, notably that of Flood and Garber (1983), but the
particular approach taken here is new, and seems to yield simpler
r esul ts.
The paper begins by laying out a simple model of pricing in
an equitymarket, then showshowthis pricingisaltered bythe
presenceof a large group of portfolio insurers. It then turns to
the more difficult case of' exchange rate determinati on under a
targetzone regime, including the case where thecommitment of
centralbanks to defense of that zone isimperfectlycredible.
Whilethesetwoexampl es are of consi der- able interest in their own
right, the paperhas abroaderpurpose aswell:the method
developedhere seems likely to be useful in a variety of
applications.
PROGRAMTRADING AND EQUITY PRICES
Amodel of equity prim.
We begin by laying out a simple model of' the determination of
prices in an equity market. This model is in the tradition of
financial market modelling associated with Tobin (1969): thatis,
it is a model of portfolio balance in which asset demands are
presumedto arisefrom some maximizing behavior, but are riot
explicitlyderived from utility maximization under uncertainty. In
2particular, we will consider only the effects of changes over time
in expected returns in affecting asset. demands, ignoring the
possible effects of changes in higher moments of the return.
Consider, then, an asset which we take to represent the
aggregate of an equity market. This asset. yields a dividend per
period of which fluctuates over time according to a process to
bedescribed below. The asset has apriceso that the expected





where is the expected price in t±1 as of period t.
Theowners of equity consist oftwo kinds of people:
portfolioinsurers, and other investors. The non--insurers are
willing to hold a value of equity that depends on the expected
rate of return:
C2) PtQ =HCrr)
whereQ is the number of stocks they hold.
To facilitate analysis, we approximate (2) by a log-linear
function, so that
(3) +q= + —+ 'Ct+l-
wherelower—case letters represent natural logarithms. Thismay be
rewritten
3c = Cl+ + —q+(3r
+iCtPt+i)J
Wenext introduce theportfolio insurers. They are assumed to
initiallyhold a block of stocks, which theywill sell whenever
theprice drops below a predetermined levelp)E.Thus in
equilibriumthenon—insurers must hold the rest of the stocks
until the price firstdrops below p*, andall of the stocks
thereafter:
CS)q =q-q3Eif minCp) > p9E
=q if minCp) < p*
whereqis the logarithm of thetotal numberof stocks
outstanding.
Tocompletethe model ,weneed tospecifyhow which is
theonly"fundamental" in the model, changes over time. It will be
assumed thatr follows arandom walk, of theform
(6) r+1 =r+ 6 withprobability 0.5
=r
-6 withprobability 0.5
This discrete random walk may appear somewhat special.
However,it maybe defended at three levels. First, itcanbe used
to approximate as closely as one likes a continuous diffusion
process, which is a popular assumption in the finance literature;
2 note that the variance of r
—issimply 6 n. .econd, the
absence of drift or more complex dynamics in the fundamental can
4be viewed as a way to eliminate all dynamic complications arising
from sources other than trigger strategies. and thus as a useful
way to concentrate on the problem at hand. Finally, the discrete
random walk assumed here is more convenient. than a continuous
process when we come to deal with the lackof "smoothness" that we
will see is a characteristic feature of markets containing trigger
strategists.
We have now laid out the basic elements of the model. The
nextstep is to analyze the dynamics of prices.
ectati ons and pricebehavior
Toanalyze the dynamics of price behavior, we must. move away
from representing variables as functions of time. Instead, we
think of the fundamental as taking on values corresponding to
"steps" of width6.Let step 0 represent the position
corresponding to the value of rt at some arbitrary date. Then any
subsequent realization of r can be labelled by the number of steps
i it is from this reference r, with
(7) rCi+1) =rCi)+6
Whatwe now want to look for is a relationship between the
returns r(i) and the price of equity pCi). That is, we are looking
for a function that relates fundamentals to prices. If we can find
a function that will provide incentives to investors to behave in
the way the function predicts, we will in fact have found an
equilibrium.
5As a first step, let us imagine what would happen if the
investors who are not portfolio insurers had static expectations,
notexpecting the price of the equity to change in any predictable
way. If = thenfrom (4) we have
CS)pCi) =Ci+(D1(ct—q+(rCi))
This would lead to the situation illustrated in Figure 1. As
long as the portfolio insurers were still in the market, the price
11 of equity would fluctuate along the line E E ,definedby the
equation pCi) =Cl+)1(a-Cq-q)-j?rCi)).Once the
portfolio insurers had left the market, the price would fluctuate
along the line defined by pCi) =Cl+(D1Cct -q-(rCi)).
The price after the por tfol iainsurers have left must be lower for
any given dividend rate, because the other investors have to be
given an incentive to hold a larger quantity of stock.
In this static expectations world, it is easy to see how
portfolio insurance schemes can cause a stock market crash.
Suppose that initially the insurers are present, so that the price
fluctuatesalong E1E1. Thenat some point the random motion of r
will bring the market to the point C, precipitating the exit of
the insurers and pushing the market into the other regime: that
is, asmall (perhaps infinitesimal) negative shock to the
fundamentals produces the Collapse of the Dow CD.
Thismay be a pretty good story f or what happened on October
19. However, ingeneralwe would not expect market dynamics to be
so simple, because the non—programmatic investors have an obvious
incentive toforeseesuch events. Thus we next turn to the
6question of what happens if the market has rational expectations,
which take into account the effects of portfolio insurance schemes
on future prices.
Itis helpful to define a new variable: the deviation of the
equitypricefrom what itwould have been if expectations were




Now from any step ithereisanequal probability that the
marketwill move to steps i-i arid 1+1. Using this, together with
equation C4), we can write a difference equation in dCi):
(10) dCi) =Cr/2)CdCi+1)+dCi—1))/C1++
= Cp/2)CdCi+1)+dCi—1))
Noticethat this is not a difference equation over time: it
isa difference equation defined over "steps". Its solution will
determine the value of'pas a funtion of i and thus implictly as a
function of the fundamental rCi).





The equilibrium relationship between i and d(i) must take the
7form
i i (12) dC1) Ap1
+Bp
where A and B may change when the regime shifts from one with the
portfolio insurers present to one in which they are gone.
To determine equilibrium values of A and B, we need one
further, though reasonable assumption. This is that dCi), the
deviation of the price from its static expectations level, is
bounded to some maximum values both positive and negative. (Any
non-infinite bound will do). This is effectively a "no speculative
bubbles"assumption, of the kind now very familiar, and it is made
without apology.
Given this assumption, we may quickly determine the
equilibrium for the regime after the portfolio insurers have sold
out. Under this regime, i may take on any value, and will if we
give it long enough to walk randomly around. This means, however,
that for any nonzero A or B wewillsee dCi) exceeding itsbound:
as igoes to +wehave becoming unbounded, while as i goes to
—wehave =1/ptdoing the same. So in the post—insurance
regime the onlyequilibrium is where d(i) =0always. This
corresponds to the case where the price always lies on the line
22. £E in Figure 1.
Untilthe portfolio insurers drop out, however, we may have a
more i nt.er esti ng equi ii br I urn. The reason is that under this regime
ihasa lower bound —thepoint at which theportfolio i risurers
leavethemarket. It is still possible thatcan range up to +i,
sothat to rule out speculative bubbles we must have A0, but it
8is still possible to have a nonzero B. Thus inthe regime where
insurers have not yet sold out we have
C13) dCi) =p2dCi—1)
Thefundamentals-price relationship in this regime is tied
down by the fact that when the price falls belowthe trigger
level, there is a transition to the otherregime. So the overall
picture must be as shown in Figure 2. The curve labelled
describes the behavior ofpriceswhiletheportfolio insurers are
still in the market.Eventually randomwalking of r will bring the
market to C, leading the insurers to dropout. After- that point,
the market's behavior will he described by theschedule labelled
£2.
The geometry of jjg strateq equilibrium
The equilibrium illustrated in Figure 2 hasa useful
interpretationthat will be crucial in understanding the more
complex case of a target zone system treated in the remainder of
the paper. Notice that in the case where portfolio insurershave
not yet dropped out, the equity price lies below that which would
prevail with static expectations --thatis, it must be the case
that the price is expected to fall. But how is thispossible,
given that earnings follow a random walk? The answer lies in the
concaviti of the relationship between r and p. Because of the
curvature of the relationship, Jensen's inequality applies and the
expected change in p is negative. This observation can be turned
9around: whenever p lies below its static—expectations locus, the
fundamentals—price relationship must be concave (and whenever p
lies above, it must be convex). This provides a rule forquickly
analyzingthe qualitative characteristics of price behavior in
triggerstrategy equilibria, as we will see inthe target zone
caseas well.
Note also what happens at point C, where the portfolio
insurers dropout.When the non—insurers have rational
expectations,there is no step drop inp;instead, the
pre--programmed sale of assets is willingly purchased. The reason
forthis is the change in the curvature of the fundamentals—price
relationship. Just before the sell-out, this relationship is
concave;just after, it becomes linear. The expected change in p
therefore goes from negative to zero, implying a willingness of
investors other than participants in portfolio insurance schemes
to hold more equities --withthe equilibrium being constructed so
that. what they are willing to buy exactly matches what the
portfolioinsurers proceed to sell.
EXCHANGERATE BEHAVIOR WITHIN A TARGET ZONE
We now turn to the more elaborate issue of how the presence
of an exchange rate target. zone ——aband within which the
exchange rate is supposed to remain, and which central banks are
expected to somehow defend if necessary ——affectsexchange rate
behavior. Clearly the fact that the exchange rate will not be
allowedto go outside the band must have an effect on expectations
within the band; we would expect that as the exchange rate nears
10the top of the band it will be perceived that it has more room to
go down than up, and conversely at the bottom of the band. This in
turn should produce stabilizing expectations that tend to keep the
exchangerate within the band even when the band is notactively
beingdefended. The objective here is to take these vague
expectations and justify them with a clear model. Aswe willsee,
thepossibility of an imperfectly credible target zone, and the
corresponding risk of crisis, can also be accommodated within this
framework.
The basic model
Asin the equity market model, we consider a situation where
the exchange rate reflects both fundamentals and expected
appreciation and depreciation. In the target zone model ,however,
it is also useful to make a distinction between the "shadow"
exchange rate, which is the exchange rate that would prevail at
eachmoment if there were no action taken by the central banks,
arid the actual exchange rate. Inside the target zone the shadow
rate and the actual coincide, but when the shadow rate lies
outside the band the actual rate is constrained to lie at the
band's upper or lower limit.




wherex represents the "fundamentals"thatultimately drive the
11exchange rate. A pure monetarist approach might identify x with
domestic credit, which is allowed to be reflected in money inside
the band but is offset by intervention when the limits are
reached; however, the model need not be construed in this
particular fashion, and x could represent the sum of a more
general set of influences.
Therelationshipbetween fundamentals, expected future rate,





We assume that the fundamental x follows a di.screte random
walk;
(16) x41 x +6with probability0.5
x
-6with probability 0.5
Finally, the actual exchange rate depends on the shadow
exchange rate and on thetarget zone. We assume that the exchange
rate is not allowed to goabove a maximum value of s or below a
minimumvalue of s. The determination of the actual rate is
therefore described by
C17)s =sif s >
=ifs > >
=sifs < s
12Exactly how this band is enforced will not, be specified.
Again in a purely monetary model we could envisage unsterilized
interventionthat, offsets domestic credit creation when the
exchange rate hits thelimitsof theband,but the general
framework can be considered to apply to other policy measures as
wel 1.
It will be helpful if we choose units so that the target zone
is centered around a zero logarithm of the exchange rate:
(18) s=-- s
We can then conveniently label the step" corresponding to a
zero x as zero, so that (again using the notation that. relates
variables t.o steps rather than time periods)
19 XCI) =16
Exchange rate behavior inside the get zone
Insidethe target zone the actual exchange rate is equal to
itsshadow value. What we want to do is find a function relating
the exchange rate to I, which is then implicitly a relationshup
between s and x. If t.here were static expectations, sCi) would
simply equal x(i);thisprovides a useful reference line. Define
dCi) as the difference between the exchange rate and the
fundamental s,
(20) dCi)sd) —x(i)
13Then from (1) and (16) we have
(21) d(i) =(/2)dCi+1)+(X/2)dCi--1)
This difference equation has two positive, real roots:
(22) p1 =X1(1+(1-X2)1"2J> 1
p2 = — ci - 2)1/2]=l/p1< 1
Any solution inside the band must take the form
(23) dCi)ApBp
Thismay be simplified by exploiting the symmetry we have
imposed on the problem. Since the band is centered around zero,
and since there is no drift in the assumed process generating
fundamentals, the exchange rate should be symmetric around zero.
In particular, sCO) must equal zero. This can only be true if B =
-A,so that the solution takes the form
(24) dCi) =A(p-pJ
Wecan confirm that this is indeed a symmetric function,by
noting that
(2) dC—i) =AUp1' - p21]
=A[p-
14-dCi)
Wecan immediately make a guess about whattherelationship
between fundamentals and the exchange rate must look like; this is
shownin Figure 3. Within the band the exchange rate must lie
along an S-shaped curve, lying below the 45° line in the upper
half of the band, above the 45° line in the lower half. In the
right hand part of the S the curve is concave, providing through
Jensen's inequality the expected decline in the exchange rate that
in turn keeps the curve below the 45° line. In the left hand part
of the S the curve is convex, providing the expected rise that
keeps the rate above the line. A curve of precisely this shape
will be generated by equation (24) if A is negative: the deviation
of the exchange rate fromxCi)willthen benegativeand growing
fori>O, and reversed for i<O.
We know, then, the general shape of'theexchange rate curve
within the target zone. We can also see directly that the
expectation that the target zone will be defended does stabilize
exchange rates within the band. The slope of the S—curve is always
lessthan 45°, so that changes in the fundamentals are reflected
lessthan fully in the exchange rate; correspondingly, the
exchangerate will remain within the band without intervention for
values of x that would have placed s outside the band in the
absence of a target zone.
To go further, it is necessary to tie down the S—curve.
Algebraically,this means determining A in equation C24).
Geometrically(and economically),what we need to dois determine
the level of x (or equivalently the step i) at which the S-curveintersects the band. That is, at what level of the fundamentals do
the authorities have to make good on their promise to defend an
exchange rate target zone?
Luidownthe ends of the S
Let I be the step at which the S-curve intersects the upper
limit of the target zone. (It must correspondingly intersect the
lower limitat-I, but the symmetry of the problem allows us to
focus only on the upper end). The economic meaning of I is that
when the fundamental drifts up to x(I)theexchange rate would
overstep the bounds of the zone unless the authorities intervene.
Thisimplies that I is the lowest value of i such that
(26) sCI) > s
Consider the elements determining the shadow exchange rate at
the upper boundary of the target zone. The shadow exchange rate is
a weighted average of the fundamentals, the exchange rate at the
next lower step, and the exchange rate at the next higher step:
(27) sCI)(i—X)x(I) +CX/2)sCI—l)+CX/2)s(I+l)
This may be restated as a relationship between deviations
from the fundamental level, as
(28) d(I) =CX/2)d(I—1)+Ck/2)dCi+1)
16where d(I) =sCI)—xCI).
Now step I-i lies inside the band, and therefore is
determined by (24). This implies that it can be related to d(I),
by the expression
(28)dCI—1)=dCI)Cp — p1)/(p — p)
Fromstep I to step 1+1 the actualexchange rate does not
change:in both cases it lies at the top of the band, at s.
However, xCI+1) =x(I)÷6. Thus
C30) dCI-f-1) =dCI)6




We can nowdivide through by dCI) to getan expression for
d(I)/dCI); the equilibrium is the lowest value of I f or which this
ratio islower than one. We have
(32)dCI)/d(I) = (X/2)ECp1 — p)/Cp — p)+1 — 6/dCI)J
Theshape of (32) is illustrated in Figure 4. Definefasthe
stepat which xCi) =s.Thenat I close to I, d(I) is negative and
close to zero, so that the third term in (32) becomes unboundedly
large. Onthe other side, as I goes to infinity the third term
vanishes and the expression approaches a limit of
17C X/2) (1i/p13< 1
The curve must therefore cross 1 from above, giving us an
equilibrium I.
A numerical example
Figure 5 shows a computation of therelationshipbetween
fundamentals and exchange rates based upon some quasi—realistic
parameters. The assumptions are as follows:
Period length: 0.01 years
X:0.9975 (implies that 1 percent annual rate of expected
depreciation reduces actual exchange rate by 4
percent).
6:0.02 (impliesannualstandard deviation ofexchange rate in
absenceof target zone of 20 percent).
5:0,10 (target zone 20 percent wide, 10 percent above and below
reference exchange rate)
In the absence of a target zone the exchange rate would
simply move up and down the 45° line in Figure 5. It would cross
theboundaries of the indicated band at "steps" 5 and —5, that is,
when the fundamental x got 10 percent.of fitsstarting point. The
commitmentto defending the target zone creates stabilizing
expectations that greatly widen the range of fundamentals that
leadto an outcome within the band. Specifically, the crossing
18point I turns out to occur at step 17that is, when the
fundamentals are 34 percent away from their starting point.
Because of its strong effect in stabilizing expectations, a
commitment to a target zone that is regarded as credible is likely
to succeed in stabilizing the exchange rate for an extended period
withoutactually requiring any action from the authorities. One
measureof this stabilizing effect is the expected length of time
that the exchange rate will remain inside the band without
intervention. In this numerical example, there is a 50 percent
probability that in the absence of a target zone the exchange rate
would lie outside a 20 percent—wide band within 19 periods --that
is, within 0. 19 years, or about 10 weeks. With a totally credible
commitment by the authorities to defend such a 20 percent zone,
there is a 50 percent probability that no action on the
authorities' part will be necessary for 219 periods, or mor-e than
two years!
This seems to suggest that announcing a commitment to defend
a target zone is a highly attractive action for politicians, since
large rewards in exchange rate stability will result immediately,
while the bill in terms of policy actions will not come due for
some time. We can think of this as the "target zone honeymoon"; it
is similar in a way to the initial capital inflows that result
when a country with a crawling peg slows the crawl in an effort to
reduce inflation (Connolly and Taylor 1984). A substantial
honeymoon effect may well have taken place in 1987, when markets
probably gave politicians more credit f or a willingness to act
than they deserved. However, in general we would expect the market
to discount promises to some extent, so that the next question is
19what happens when the target zone is only partially credible.
Credibility and crises
Suppose that the market believes that there is only a
probabilitythatthe announced target zone will actually be
defended if challenged, and that with probability 1- the exchange
rate will actually be allowed t. move beyond the band. This will
clearly affect the dynamics of the exchange rate within the band:
stabilizing expectations will be weaker, and the expected length
of time before the authorities' resolve is challenged will be
shorter.
Let be the step on which the target zone is tested in the
case of partial credibility. What happens at this step is that an
incipient movement of the exchange rate beyond the band either
does or does not bring forth the promised defense. If the defense
isprovided, the authorities are now credible, and the exchange
rate jumps to its full credibility level sCI). If the defense is
not provided, the market has discovered that itis living undera
freefloat, and the exchange rate jumps to its floating level
xCI). Thus theexpectedexchange rate at l, which must equal
the shadow rate at-that point, is
= ØsCI)+Cl-)X(Ipc)
Thechallenge to the target zone therefore takes place at the
lowest i f or which > s. With the expected exchange rate
tied down at I and —I, the exchange rate behavior between
20these bounds is describedbya "squeezed" S—curve obeying equation
(24) and connecting these end points.
Figure 6 shows the exchange rate's behavior in our numerical
example when the market believes that there is only a O percent
chance that the authorities will actually defend the target zone.
The 10 percent band is now challenged after only 8 steps fr-om
zero, thatis, afterfundamentals have moved .16 percent away from
their starting point. There is still significant stabilization of
the exchange rate within the band, but the expected longevity of
the "target zone honeymoon" is greatly reduced: there is now a O
percent chance that the band will be challenged within 49 periods,
or about 6 months.
An interesting feature of the functioning of animperfectly
credibletarget zone is that more or less continuous movement of
the fundamental determinants of the exchange rate gives rise to a
discontinuous movement of the exchange rate itself: when the
exchange rate drifts up to the edge of the zone, there is a
"crisis" in which the exchange rate jumps. The reason why such
crises are not ruled out by rational expectations is that the
exchange rate may jump either way —intothe band or out of it ——
withthe expected jump being zero.However, the role of
irnperfecti y cr edi bi e target zones ingeneratingcrises mayhelp
explain why there are occasional eras of turbulence" under
managed exchange rates, a point noted by Mussa (1979).
CONCLtJSI ONS
This paper has offered a general method for analyzing markets
21containing trigger strategists, arid twoapplications,of which the
analysis of target zones is the more extensive and probably the
most important.
The method is to look for an equilibrium relationship between
thefundamental determinants of an asset price and its actual
price. Surprisingly, the curvature of this relationship plays a
crucialrole,with concavity orconvexity creating the
expectations ofrisingor falling asset prices that drive
deviationsfrom the static expectations case.
The application to exchange r-ate target zones reveals
threeimportant features of such zones that are widely understood
but not reflected in formal analysis. First, the presence of a
commitment by authorities to keep the exchange rate within a band
tends to stabilize the movement of the exchange rate even inside
thatband. Second, announcement of a target zone will normally
provide a "target zone honeymoon": an extended period of time in
which stabilizing expectations keep the exchange rate within the
band without any need f or official action. Third, an imperfectly
credible target zone system will give rise to crises in which the
market challenges the commitment of the authorities to defend the
zone.
Themodels offered inthis paper are of course highly
simplifiedand abstract. However, the conclusions seem plausible.
and the method used here can be applied to more complex and
realisticmodels in the future.
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